University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Publications since 2000

Center for Public Affairs Research

6-30-2014

Hiding in Plain Sight: Omaha’s 160-Year Assault on the Urban
Poor, Minorities and the Disadvantaged: A Critical Dialogue Paper
R. K. Piper
Theresa Barron-McKeagney

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cparpublications
Part of the Public Affairs Commons

Hiding in Plain Sight: Omaha’s 160-Year Assault on the Urban Poor,
Minorities and the Disadvantaged

A CRITICAL DIALOGUE PAPER
June 30, 2014

Prepared for the Society for the Study of Social Problems
2014 Annual Meeting
By:

R.K. Piper
Theresa Barron-McKeagney

College of Public Affairs and Community Services
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE 68182

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXAMINING COMMUNITY-CULTURE AND LOCAL NARRATIVE TO
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS POVERTY & RELATED SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN
OMAHA, NEBRASKA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………...4
I. INTRODUCTION…………….………………......................................................................16
A. A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY CULTURE AND POVERTY…………….16
B. PURPOSES OF THE STUDY AND OVERVIEW………………………………..18
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER……………………………………………....19
II. COMMUNITY CULTURE, NARRATIVES, IMPACTS ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS…20
A. COMMUNITY POWER IN OMAHA……………………….…………………….21
1. Elite/Private-Sector Leadership, Centrally-Controlled Decision-Making….....22
2. Overriding Values of Economic Reductionism and Profit Motives……..........23
3. Omaha’s and Nebraska’s Comparatively Weak & Ineffective Government…25
4. Role of “Free” Press in Public Policy and Social Control…………….……....26
B. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN OMAHA…………………………………………….…….27
1. High Levels Social Bonding, Low Levels Social Bridging Capital…………..28
2. Social Norms and Unspoken Rules……………………………………………29
3. Philanthropy & Social Networks as Mechanisms of Elite Control……………30
4. Structural Racism, Sexism and Other Forms of Exclusion………….………..31
C. POLITICAL HISTORY IN OMAHA…………………………………….……….32
1. Citizen Participation………………………………………………….………..32
2. Private-Sector Control of Public Process and Policy…………………..……...34
3. Political Leadership……………………………………………………...........36

2

III. OMAHA’S COMMUNITY-CULTURE NARRATIVE VS. OMAHA’S REALITY….38
A. THE “VIRTUALLY-UTOPIAN” NARRATIVE………………………….……..38
B. THE REALITY OF OMAHA’S EXCLUDED, DAMAGED COMMUNITIES..42
1. History and Current Context of Anti-Poverty Measures in Omaha………...…42
2. Catastrophic NE State Government Failures Worsening Poverty………….…51
IV. STUDY FINDINGS, ANALYSES, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS……...55
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE, MODERNIZATION, IMPROVEMENT..55
1. Communities, Cultures and Narratives Are Not Static…………………..........56
2. Youth, Generational Change in Social, Economic, Political Progress………..56
3. Call for a More “Public Regarding” Community Culture……….……………57
4. Strengthening Government/Nonprofits, Increasing Citizen Participation…….57
5. Community Culture, Poverty/Social Problems Research/Policy Development58
V. REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………59

3

EXAMINING COMMUNITY-CULTURE AND LOCAL NARRATIVE TO
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS POVERTY & RELATED SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN
OMAHA, NEBRASKA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this the 50th year since President Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. Congress declared a
national domestic war to address the massive crisis of poverty in the United States, it seems a
fitting time to take a “completely fresh look” at the multiplicity of factors underlying this
devastating and extremely-complex problem. Based on a combination of unique historical and
community-cultural characteristics and the very poor poverty-related outcomes described in this
paper, the City of Omaha [Nebraska] provides a case study to better understand the roots and
nature of poverty.
Based largely on Patrick McNamara’s invaluable, but since neglected, 2007 comparative
case study of Omaha’s community culture, 1 this paper shows that certain components of and
patterns within it, have been identified that are clearly tied to some of the worst urban-minority
poverty and related socio-economic problems in the United States. These preliminary findings
are especially ironic, as Omaha as an entity and a great many of its citizens, see and tout
themselves and their home-place as a virtually-utopian representation of “the good life” and
among the absolutely best places to live, raise families and conduct business anywhere in the
country and the entire world.
Our examination and analyses of McNamara’s primarily qualitative, theory-building
study, along with additional research findings, form the foundation for this paper, which we hope
will be a “bridge” to the future development of a more-quantitative, applied research and
poverty-policy development agenda. By focusing on the identified components of Omaha’s
community culture which are linked to poverty and other local problems, this new information
should be of enormous benefit to individuals and institutions that are addressing the many
concrete issues and ongoing, poverty-related crises in Omaha and Nebraska.
COMMUNITY CULTURE AND CULTURAL NARRATIVES
“Community culture” is generally defined as the concepts, memes, beliefs, values,
customs, practices, language, behaviors and institutions that help define a particular population.
To summarize and comprehend this defining information, certain stories are created that come to
represent a group or population’s self- and shared identities and values. These tales are
commonly referred to as “community-culture” narratives within academic disciplines such as
sociology, cultural anthropology, social-psychology, history, political-economics, etc. [Howard,
1991].
A more-specific and academic definition of “community-culture” (and the corresponding
cultural narrative) employed in this paper, is the one used by McNamara, which includes three
major definitional factors: 1) community power, 2) social capital and 3) political history.
See “Collaborative Success and Community Culture: Cross-Sectoral Partnerships Addressing Homelessness in
Omaha and Portland (McNamara, 2007).”
1
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Taken together, these factors are used to create various typologies or archetypes that are found in
different cities and locations, which may then be used to more-accurately and meaningfully
understand and evaluate local community cultures, narratives and their impacts.
A. COMMUNITY POWER IN OMAHA
Community Power has generally been defined as the intentional use of various resources
to exert a group’s collective will over others (Wrong, 1995: Domhoff, 2002). McNamara
modifies this definition somewhat in his work, in emphasizing that power is also, “…a group’s
ability to use resources to achieve desired ends.” The following factors are of primary
importance in classifying Omaha as a “private-sector” community culture (McNamara, 2007).
1. Elite/Private-Sector Leadership and Centrally-Controlled Decision-Making
Since the city’s inception in 1854, a clear pattern of highly-centralized and concentrated
control and decision-making, wielded by a relatively-small group of elite and powerful leaders
(usually private-sector businessmen), has existed and persisted. In three major eras, 2 under
widely-different economic and social conditions, this defining factor of strong top-down, almost
exclusively private-sector leadership, has been shown to be the driving and controlling force in
Omaha’s development and performance.
2. Overriding Values of Economic Reductionism and Profit-Motives in Omaha Culture
While it might not be surprising that economic and financial gain are the dominant values
in a private-sector community culture (McNamara, 2007), the extent to which they override and
undermine efforts to address serious social problems like poverty in Omaha, is not widely
recognized or understood. These findings are consistent with elite control and economic
“growth machine” theories (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987), which reveal that
economic self-interest and maximization of financial gain for the elite, is the primary motivation
behind private sector, government and non-profit collaborations to develop land and construct
buildings and infrastructure. 3
While some argue this development benefits the entire community by creating
employment (Peterson, 1981), critics point out that such a single-minded focus on the generation
of enormous profits for the economic elite and other beneficiaries, comes at the expense of the
working poor, racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups (Waste, 1993; Box,
1998) and results in weaker growing income and wealth inequality within a community
(Krugman, 2014).
The three (3) eras of elite, private-sector control in Omaha are: 1) Initial Omaha “Boosterism,” rampant elite
land-use speculation and development, Trans-Continental Railroad/Union Pacific Outside-Investor Control (18541897), 2) Political-Boss Tom Dennison’s Elite Power and Control for the Private Sector (1898-1931) and 3) Elite
Private-Sector and Corporate Control from Ak-Sar-Ben to Heritage Services (1932-Present). See (Larsen and
Cotrell, 1982, 1997; McNamara, 2007).
2

An extremely-long list of such “growth-machine” projects in Omaha over the decades, includes the three most
recent ones: 1) the $291 million CenturyLink/Qwest Convention Center (2003), 2) the $92 million Holland Center
for the Performing Arts (2009) and 3) the $132 million TD Ameritrade Baseball Park (built to retain the NCAA
College World Series in Omaha until at least 2035 if constructed).
3
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3. Omaha’s and Nebraska’s Comparatively Weak and Ineffective Governments
Other effects of long-term, over-reliance on a small group of private-sector leaders for all
important community decision-making, control of social-power networks and the distribution of
jobs, incomes and other economic benefits, is that local and state governments and nonprofit
organizations will likely be relatively weak and ineffective in addressing social problems and
other matters (Lynd & Lynd, 1927; Hunter, 1953; Stone, 2005).
4. The Role of the “Free” Press in Public Policy and Social Control
A final factor of community power noted in this paper (and examined in more detail by
McNamara), is the role of the local press serving as a tool of the elite to maintain power and
control in Omaha. Even prior to the City’s founding in1854, the business elite have continuously
used the local newspapers 4 in a “booster” capacity to advertise and promote Omaha as an “ideal
garden” for investment and opportunity (Larsen & Cotrell, 1997). Since its inception in 1889, 5
the Omaha World-Herald (the city’s only paper since 1937) has vigorously and continuously
pushed the views of the controlling business leaders and their agenda, virtually becoming the
embodiment of the Omaha elite and their values system (Darlstrom, 1988).
B. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN OMAHA
Social capital was first popularly defined and expanded upon by Robert Putnam in his
works investigating the nature and status of civic engagement (1993, 1995 and 2000). Other
social scientists also contributed to and expanded the modern concept, noting that the function of
social capital (like that of physical infrastructure/factories and financial and human capital in the
production of goods and services) is to facilitate the productive achievement of particular
societal goals, outcomes and ends (Coleman, 1990; Edwards and Foley, 1999).
A similar working definition used by McNamara in his study is that, “Social capital
consists of networks of trust and the norms that exist in a community to be productively used by
individuals and organizations […to get things done that cannot otherwise be done].”
1. High Levels of Social Bonding and Low Levels of Social Bridging Capital
The networks of trust or connectedness that exist within some groups, such as those of
community leadership for example, exhibit extremely high levels of “social bonding” capital
(Putnam & Feldstein, 2003) and trust between the individuals that have been admitted and
accepted into the group. If a person or organization has these types of personal “connections,”
access to sufficient resources and opportunities [in Omaha] will very likely be made available by
those in power (Banfield & Wilson, 1963).

These early Omaha papers are The Arrow (June, 1854), the Nebraskian (1856), the Nebraskian and Times (1859),
the Nebraska Republican (1863), the Omaha Herald (1865), the Omaha Bee (1872), the Evening World (1885).

4

The paper was founded in its present form through the merger of the Omaha Herald (1865) and the Omaha
World (1885).
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The equally or perhaps even more-negative downside of these very high-bonding
networks of trust, is that those not within or connected to certain groups, feel the extremely low
levels of “social bridging” social capital (Putnam & Feldstein, 2003). The resulting inability of
many or most individuals and organizations to have meaningful connections with “more-elite”
individuals and groups, creates the very-real and oppressive sense and atmosphere, that Omaha is
highly “fractional” and “fragmented” (McNamara 2003).
2. Social Norms and Unspoken Rules in Omaha
The “norms” and “unspoken rules” in Omaha manifest as “conservative” pressures to
live traditional lifestyles that include long-term hetero-sexual marriage, child-rearing, church
attendance, community volunteerism and/or donating to charities and causes, along with the
display of other expected values, attitudes, behaviors, duties and obligations. The over-riding
theme is that to rise to a level of affluence and influence in Omaha, persons need to conform to,
live within and abide by these normative systems and constraints (McNamara, 2007).
3. Philanthropy and Social Networks as Mechanisms of Elite Control
Through the decades, private-sector leaders and their followers, employees and
collaborating individuals and institutions have employed a variety of mechanisms to gain and
maintain power and control of others in Omaha (Larsen & Cotrell, 1997). Eikenberry (2007)
notes that even philanthropy, through control of its boards and social networks, the determination
of the type and nature of funded projects, the levels of funding and in other ways, can be a
mechanism of elite community power and social control.
4. Structural Racism, Sexism and Other Forms of Exclusion in Omaha
Other forms of social control by the elite are related to the access that is allowed or not
allowed to people of color, women, nonprofit and social service leaders, government officials
and other “outsiders” (McNamara, 2007). While some in Omaha insist that these forms of
discrimination and exclusion do not even exist anymore in this city, the data collected from key
informants provides strong evidence that this is certainly not the case.
C. POLITICAL HISTORY IN OMAHA
Political history is the third aspect of community culture to be considered, which
McNamara further refines among three sub-indicators: 1) citizen participation, 2) control of
public process and policy 6 and 3) leadership. He also notes that understanding the political
history of a locale is especially important in accurately classifying the type of community-culture
under study.
1. Citizen Participation
McNamara (2007) notes that high levels of citizen participation and meaningful firsthand involvement in the democratic decision-making process, as occurs in Portland [Oregon], is
McNamara specifically cites land-use planning, development and valuation decisions, as examples of how control
of these by the private-sector elites, defines and impacts public/private “collaborations” in Omaha.
6
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a defining characteristic of public-sector community cultures, as opposed to private-sector
cultures where major decisions are controlled and made by a small, elite as in Omaha.
For citizens to acquire greater and more-significant democratic participation, many
factors such as: 1) politicians and public administrators creating more avenues for real
involvement, 2) higher expectations by citizens that participation is a fundamental right and 3)
holding both public and private-sector leaders of the local power-structure accountable for bad
decisions and poor social and economic outcomes are necessary.
2. Private-Sector Control of Public Process and Policy in Omaha
Growth machine theory holds that elite groups control local government decisions to
maximize economic benefits to themselves, their members and/or employees and followers
(Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987). Political decisions, for example those related to
proposed public/private construction projects, endorsed by the elite/corporate leaders who stand
to gain the most monetarily from them, are regularly supported and approved by politicians
(whose political campaigns have been supported by the private developers) and are then
implemented by public administrators.
Although the local booster-narrative is that this is a good model of public-privatenonprofit inter-sectoral partnership and collaboration, this largely-concealed process often ends
up being little more than, “…an insulated, elitist activity in which residents, neighborhood
groups, grass-roots community organizations and individual citizens are not viewed as essential
or explicit to these initiatives” (Turner, 2002).
3. Political Leadership
The elite leadership of Omaha has primarily been private-sector “heavy weights,” who
have obtained and retained tight control for all but of few of the sixteen (16) decades the city has
existed (McNamara, 2007). One of McNamara’s important conclusions, is that a challenge in
improving community cultures and collaborations, is the false notion that one sector can
completely dominate all others. To have a healthy, prosperous, fully-functioning and wellintegrated community “….one sector alone cannot sustain a community.”
III. OMAHA’S COMMUNITY-CULTURE NARRATIVE VS. OMAHA’S REALITY
This chapter presents a further examination of Omaha’s community-culture and narrative,
presenting additional more-quantitative (objective) data as it relates to both. As shown in the
preceding chapter, Omaha’s community-culture narrative, historically paints a portrait of Omaha
as unquestionably among the best places in the U.S. and world, to live, raise families and
conduct business.
A. THE “VIRTUALLY-UTOPIAN” NARRATIVE OF OMAHA
Omaha is home to five Fortune 500 companies: Berkshire Hathaway, ConAgra Foods,
Union Pacific, Peter Kiewit Sons' and Mutual of Omaha. As noted in the Omaha World Herald:
“Using the federal government’s broadest definition of what constitutes a metropolitan
area, a World Herald analysis shows that Omaha is home to more Fortune 500
8

companies per capita than any major metro area in the nation.” (Cordes, February 3,
2013).
Similarly, Omaha’s Chamber of Commerce and the Omaha World Herald consistently
present Omaha’s other positive, high national rankings on a variety of community factors, which
tend to support the utopian claims of the city’s incomparable virtues. Some of these “best”
national rankings are presented in the left-hand column of Table 1 below.
To provide a more-balanced and accurate view of other wide-ranging, actual conditions
in Omaha, however, the left-hand column presents a side-by-side comparison of some of
Omaha’s “worst” national conditions’ rankings. This pertinent and often dismissed information
demonstrates why large segments of the population refer to the city as “The Two Omaha’s.”
Table 1
Best and Worst Conditions Rankings and Indicators for Greater Omaha [Nebraska]
OMAHA’S BEST CONDITIONS
OMAHA’S WORST CONDITIONS
RANKINGS & INDICATORS
RANKINGS & INDICATORS
(Source)
(Source)
#3
Best Cities to Start a Business
#3 Highest U.S. Black Poverty Rate
(100 Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas)

(Nerdwallet.com)

(U.S. Census Bureau)
#1 Highest U.S. Black-Children Poverty Rate

#1 New and Expanding Facilities
(MSA’s 200,000 – 1 Million)

(100 Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas)

(Site Selection Magazine)
#1 Top 10 Best Cities to Raise a Family

(U.S. Census Bureau)
#2 Highest U.S. Rate of Placing Children in
Foster Care 7

(Movoto Blog)
#3

(U.S. Department Health and Human Services)
#1 Highest U.S. Black Homicide Victimization
Rate

Number of Economic Development
Projects
(MSA’s 200,000 – 1 Million)

(Violence Prevention Center)

(Site Selection Magazine)
#2 America’s 10 Best Cities for Professional
Women
#4

#2 Highest Percentage of Hourly Workers
Earning at or Below Minimum Wage 8

(Motovo Blog)
Top 50 Military-Friendly Cities

(U.S. Department of Labor)
#2 Lowest U.S. Eligibility Level for Childcare
Assistance for Low-Income Working Families 9

(G.I. Jobs)

This ranking is for the state of Nebraska with the vast majority of placements occurring in families in Omaha.
The ranking is within the mid-western geographic region.
9
Based on the percentage of the official U.S. Poverty Level set by the state of Nebraska (and translated into
dollars).
7
8
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(Nebraska Appleseed Center)
#1 Least Financial Stress on Households

#2

(Credibility.org)

Widest U.S. Economic Disparity Between
Black and White Residents
(Omaha World-Herald)
#1 Highest U.S. Black Arrest Rates for
Marijuana Possession

#1 Best City for Cheapskates
(Kiplinger, 2013)

(American Civil Liberties Union, 2013)

B. THE REALITY OF OMAHA’S EXCLUDED AND DAMAGED COMMUNITIES
With all the massive resources available in Omaha, among many highly-vested
philanthropic foundations, a high proportion of wealthy professionals and businessmen and an
elite private-sector leadership that never fails at any initiative or project they undertake
(McNamara, 2007), policy-makers must ask, “Why then, does Omaha continue to produce and
struggle with such extreme poverty after 50 years of “effort?” And perhaps more importantly, if
the private-sector leadership takes credit for all the positive economic outcomes that have been
produced, must they not also have to take responsibility for all the extremely-poor social
outcomes that Omaha has also produced?
Why do Omaha and Nebraska have minority-child poverty rates at 18% (the highest in
the entire U.S.) and 34% of single-parent families with related children that are below poverty at
a rate; 16,597 adults and children receiving welfare (TANF); 82,000 children receiving food
stamps and 223,269 children enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP (Spotlight on Poverty and
Opportunity, 2014)? Unfortunately, these data highlight the great and growing economic
disparity between the worlds of Omaha’s Fortune 500 companies, passive investors, related
businesses and industries, their employees and beneficiaries and that of the working-poor,
minority and disadvantaged citizens and their families in Omaha and Nebraska, living near or
suffering in poverty every day.
1. The History and Current Context of Anti-Poverty Measures in the U.S. and Omaha
While such simplistic beliefs and myths that the poor and minorities lack motivation,
adequate morals and/or are in poverty solely due to their own poor choices and behaviors, have
been debunked by the social sciences and human-service professionals, the objective realities of
poverty here are that: 1) nearly one in five or 20% of Omaha’s children live in poverty for at
least part of each year, 2) 30,000 Nebraskans are at risk of homelessness and 3) that at one local
Omaha elementary school, 80% of the students live at or below the poverty line. Families in
poverty have doubled since 2000 in this area.
In Nebraska, Republican Governor Dave Heineman has denied federally-funded
Medicaid expansion three times, which was made available to the states at no initial cost, as a
result of the congressionally-approved Affordable Care Act,; denied access to critically10

necessary driver licenses for authorized young people under the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA); was even against taxpayer-funded pre-natal care for undocumented
immigrants and is also against granting in-state tuition to children of undocumented immigrants.
To further explore community-cultural and narrative themes, the following section of this
summary provides additional information on some of the recently adopted policies and
implementations of poverty-related remediation measures and actions, in Omaha and Nebraska,
which have been anything but helpful or remedial.
2. Catastrophic State Government Failures Responsible for Worsening Poverty
Many catastrophic failures by Nebraska’s state government have received considerable
national attention in the New York Times and other media since 2008. This was the year that
NE Legislative Bill 157 (which was originally intended for infants, but the law did not specify
the age of youths), allowed parents/guardians to drop off any children they could not adequately
care for at hospitals and other public facilities, which children would then become legal wards of
the state and therefore eligible for previously-denied assistance, with no questions asked.
What nationally came to be knows as Nebraska’s “Safe-Haven Crisis,” was the first
major indicator and widely-visible sign, of the extent to which public mental-health, human
social, correctional and other critical services for the working poor and their children in the state,
were often non-existent or completely inaccessible to those who need them most. In 2008, 6,600
children were in the custody of the State of Nebraska, making it the second highest ratio of
children in state care in the U.S. 10
To reduce the number of state wards, the Governor and NHHS “muscled-through” and
implemented (over the vociferous but unsuccessful objections of service providers and child
advocates), an inadequately-researched and poorly understood program of “privatization” of the
child welfare system. This action practically and essentially shifted the burden and responsibility
of caring and providing critically needed services for children, from the state to five private
contractors in 2009, without budgeting adequate transitional, oversight or compensatory
resources.
While the wildly-optimistic and naïve goals of the Governor and the state were to enhance
efficiency and accountability while controlling the costs of the failing system, this effort was
another spectacular failure to address poverty and related problems. 11 A partials list of some of
the worst failures and performance by Nebraska’s state government in addressing poverty-related
problems includes:
•

Nebraska’s “Safe Haven” Crisis

10

Also at that time, there were only six practicing child psychiatrists in the entire state, and the mental and behavioral health
services for children and adolescents were scarce, unaffordable, and difficult to access, according to reports prepared by Voices
for Children, Nebraska Appleseed and (later) the Nebraska Legislature.

As reported by the Omaha World-Herald, information gathered in the investigations above, into the disastrous,
privatization initiative driven by the Republican administration, revealed that privatization has resulted in an
additional $75 million in direct expenditures for the state, not a cost savings as promised. The studies also found
that another $75 million or more in other indirect costs, due to the loss of valued and experienced state staff,
other system-wide impacts and needed remediation efforts for affected families, will be forthcoming in the next
several years. Today, only one of the original five service providers is still in business in/with Nebraska.
11
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•
•
•
•

“Privatization” of Health and Human Services/Child Welfare Programs
Federal Non-Compliance and Closing of the Beatrice, Nebraska State
Developmental Center (Mental Disability and Health Facility) 12
“Access Nebraska” (Mandatory Online System to Access SNAP/Other Benefits) 13
Nebraska Department of Corrections (Early Release of Nikko Jenkins and Other
Serious and Violent Prisoners) 14

But just as the stark incompetency and weakness of the public sector has dramatically
emerged, a recent “cross-sectoral” program failure to close Omaha’s long-standing educational
gaps (Building Bright Futures), 15 may be the first crack in the “myth of invincibility” of the
wealthy-elite domination and control of the social, economic and political culture of Omaha.
In his interviews with key community informants knowledgeable of its history and innerworkings, there was consistent agreement that if any local project or initiative was to be
successful, all that was needed was the participation and support of members of this elite group.
If these business leaders were behind a proposal, history had shown it would unquestionably be
“successful,” if they were not, it would “fail.”
While the overall analysis of public-policy was correct (that poor educational
performance and poverty are strongly linked) and the right approach, both the implementation
efforts and the amount of resources necessary to reduce or end poverty were completely
insufficient and must be dramatically larger in size and scope. Some very basic ameliorations
must include more-comparable wages and incomes throughout the city (Nebraska’s minimum
wage, received by a majority of Omaha’s working poor families, is a paltry $7.25 per hour);
universal healthcare, affordable and available transportation and housing, and an educational
This facility had a decades-long history of problems and was found out of compliance by U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (see “An Indictment of Indifference,” The Center for Disability Rights, Law and
Advocacy, 2007) costing the state approximately $30 million dollars in lost Federal revenue and fines.
12

This mandatory online system to receive welfare benefits implemented in 2011, has received constant and
severe criticism since its implementation. It is now the subject of a law suit filed by advocates for persons seeking
SNAP benefits due to unlawful extensive processing delays for the Federal Food-Stamp Benefit.
13

In June 2014, an Omaha World-Herald investigation showed that the Nebraska Department of Corrections had
improperly calculated the sentences of and/or mistakenly released approximately 873 serious and violent
offenders early, sometimes by as much as 35 years. One case is especially significant involving a now-convicted
murderer named Nikko Jenkins. Jenkins was incarcerated as a youth and had a long history of serious mentalhealth problems as a juvenile prior to his conviction. Despite this fact he was subjected to long periods of solitary
confinement and his pleas for treatment were ignored by Corrections, who believed he was “faking” them. Prior
to his release Jenkins begged for treatment and not to be released, warning officials that he was hearing voices
and that he would kill people if he was let out. Again his pleas were ignored and he killed four persons within
weeks of his being freed from custody.
14

15

Building Bright Futures (BBF) was organized in 2006 by Omaha leaders and philanthropists to address education gaps and
issues impacting poor children and their families. The goals included that within five years, every poor child in Douglas and
Sarpy County would have health care, tutors and mentors, and the opportunity to go to college. The organization spent about
$7 million dollars a year donated by Omaha philanthropists. One of the most intriguing goals of BBF was that public policy
regarding poverty would be highlighted and the initiative would insure that every poor child was as well-equipped as possible
to face the challenges pursing their education despite being poor.

12

system with highly-skilled and culturally-competent personnel who are trained to work with
families who are experiencing inter-generational poverty.
IV. STUDY FINDINGS AND ANALYSES, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The long-standing control of Omaha’s economic, social and political spheres by
generations of small, powerful, elite-circles of wealthy businessmen has produced great
economic benefits for the city, sometimes astounding personal wealth for themselves and for
many of their employees and others having connections to them (McNamara, 2007).
However, the complete domination of Omaha by a private-sector community culture and
narrative, has according to “growth theory” (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) and the
data compiled for this paper, likewise helped create and extend extreme conditions of poverty
and other social problems for many other of its citizens, particularly those who have no access to
the exclusive social and economic networks that enforce and perpetuate this culture. 16
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE, MODERNIZATION & IMPROVEMENT
The ultimate intent of this paper is not merely to criticize, but to present findings and
information about the culture and conditions of Omaha, to see if we can discern or point out
facts, patterns, perceptions, clues or new understandings, that might be useful in bringing needed
change, modernization or improvements, for the betterment of all people in Omaha, or in any
other locales where they are needed.
The following sub-sections contain what we believe are the most-important findings
gleaned through our efforts, including recommendations on how they might best be applied by
interested parties, to achieve the aforementioned goals.
1. Communities, Cultures and Narratives Are Not Static
Despite the fact that Omaha’s community culture has maintained its primary privatesector classification and other characteristics, almost continuously for 160 years since it was
founded, recent research suggests that no communities or their cultures are static or unchanging
(Sinclair, 2002). Anthony Giddens (1984) points out just the opposite in fact, arguing that
communities are continually changing, transitioning and restructuring, even if this process is not
immediately apparent.
2. The Role of Youth and Generational Change in Social, Political and Economic Progress
Historians Larsen and Cotrell and others describe the destruction of the black middle-class as primarily accruing
to four (4) economic and social policies pursued by Omaha’s leadership in the early and middle part of the 20th
Century: 1) the closure and re-organization of the meat-packing and railroad industries in Omaha that had a
devastating impact on black and minority employment, 2) comprehensive racial discrimination against blacks
which did not allow them to live or obtain housing outside a small area (ghetto) in north Omaha (where a majority
of black citizens still reside), 3) discrimination in hiring blacks to work on the construction of the Interstate
Highway System and other construction projects in the 1950’s and later and 4) the successful efforts of Omaha’s
leaders to largely exclude the federal government and its anti-poverty programs from having a strong leadership
presence in Omaha (to ensure the elite’s continuing complete dominance in policy and power) during the early
1960s and 1970s, that provided a wide array of services and benefits (including the development of a professional
class) to blacks in cities across the U.S.
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McNamara’s (2007) interviews with key informants in Omaha, demonstrate a clear
pattern of concern among various segments of the population, about what the next generation of
leaders will “bring to the table” as the previous generation retires. Some felt that the training of
replacements in the elite, private sector leadership has been well underway for years, to insure a
seamless transition with little change. Others felt quite differently and expressed hope, that the
more-evolved value-systems and extensive knowledge of successful strategies to address social
problems, could be the keys to “finally tearing down the Berlin Wall” of the imposing and
harmful, cultural resistance to needed change.
Both Omaha and Nebraska have decades-old, serious problems of massive numbers of
highly-educated and motivated youths migrating to other states (commonly referred to as the
“brain drain”). 17 These figures alone should give the private-sector and elite leadership
sufficient evidence to investigate, that perhaps some improvements and upgrades in Omaha’s
community-culture and a more-realistic narrative might be in order, to help stem the continuing
flows of talented citizens to destinations with alternative cultures.
Our new era of rapidly-evolving capacities for interactions, social organizing and
communication through social media and other forms, should enliven the imaginations of the
designers of and participants in, the next versions of social structures, processes and practices in
all disciplines, that are have already been here in other cities/states for a decade or more and are
rapidly approaching in the “laggers” throughout the U.S.
3. A Call for a More “Public Regarding” Community Culture
Dye and Zeigler (1993) are cited by McNamara in his study of Omaha’s community
culture, as calling for the private-sector elite to become more “public regarding.” This notion
may become more acceptable to the elites for a variety of reasons in the near future, perhaps
partially-based on their recent experiences of failure, in attempting to address some of Omaha’s
most-egregious social problems. This means a much greater sharing of power and decisionmaking with all citizens and public and nonprofit-sector institutions.
On some levels, there must be a realization among the leadership that higher levels of
publicly-controlled revenue are absolutely necessary, to improve state and local government
functioning and to effectively address our growing lists of worsening social and environmental
crises. There must also be a growing realization among the elite leaders, that the wildly-growing
levels of wealth and income-inequality we have seen in society for over 30 years, are simply not
sustainable and could jeopardize the entire economic system upon which the lives of everyone
(including their own) are based.
4. Strengthening Governmental & Nonprofit Sectors and Increasing Citizen Participation
In public-sector community cultures such as Portland, a stronger, more-effective and
productive government sector exists, which plays key roles in addressing social problems like
poverty, in ways that are not possible for private-sector entities (McNamara, 2007). Local and
state governments are especially well-positioned and have legally-authorized powers in creating
According to just-released U.S. Census Bureau data, Nebraska posted huge net losses of college graduates in the
past two years. In 2011 and 2012 alone, an astounding 3,680 and 4,117 more college graduates left the state than
entered it.
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avenues and venues for meaningful citizen participation in the democratic decision-making
process.
Perhaps most important of all, governments and public administrators could be the key
and legitimate actors, to initiate improved collaborative cross-sectoral projects. Such moreinclusive collaborations have proven to be the most-effective organizational structures to address
social ills like poverty, in all arenas of personal, familial and community betterment.
5. Community Culture, Poverty/Social Problems Research and Policy Development
Finally, our greatest hope and highest recommendation is that the information and
findings in this report (and any subsequent research it may help generate) be reviewed, discussed
and employed by wide-ranging and inclusive individuals, groups and institutions in Omaha,
Nebraska and interested communities anywhere. More specifically, it should be used to make
needed improvements in cultural performance, poverty abatement and related-social problem
outcomes. As we have stressed throughout, this paper should be only viewed and employed as a
starting point for additional investigation and research, better policy development and moreforceful and effective community organization and action.
Progress in these areas will require that those involved in these efforts, transcend and
help transform those aspects of the local community culture and narrative that are actually
creating poverty and other social dysfunctions, or at best, are providing unnecessary resistance to
what clearly and finally needs to be done, to diminish the expanding poverty in Omaha and
throughout the U.S.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this the 50th year since President Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. Congress declared a
national domestic war to address the massive crisis of poverty in the United States, it seems a
fitting time to take a “completely fresh look” at the multiplicity of factors underlying this
devastating and extremely-complex problem. Our initial suspicions were that the City of Omaha
and Nebraska, based on a combination of unique historical and cultural characteristics and very
poor poverty-related outcomes, might have something important to teach us to better understand
the roots and nature of poverty, as well as for the development of new anti-poverty approaches,
tools and structural reforms.
Even under the best of circumstances, where a majority of leaders and citizens in the
private, public and nonprofit sectors have a good grasp of the causes and complex nature of
poverty, and knowledge of the best practices to address it, actually doing so effectively is still a
tremendous challenge. When such comprehension is completely missing or blurred however (for
example, based on false or incomplete understandings of community-culture and cultural
narratives), tragic failures in policy prescriptions and achieving desired outcomes are wholly
predictable and inevitable.
A. A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY CULTURE AND POVERTY
Beginning with the city’s founding in 1854 and continuing for 160 years, the leaders,
citizens and institutions of Omaha [Nebraska] have contributed in countless ways to the
development of the current community-culture and the dominant narrative that helps explain,
shape, sustain and drive it. Although Omaha’s culture has evolved through strikingly different
eras and conditions over the last century and a half-plus, certain components and patterns have
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emerged and been identified, that form the basis for the “preliminary” case study presented in
this paper.
It is our hope and primary intention, that these largely qualitative (subjective) and theoretical
findings, will be useful in further quantitative (objective) and applied (“real world”)
investigation, documentation, analyses and comprehension of the entire spectrum of communityculture factors and their collective impacts and outcomes. The evidence collected in previous
research, clearly shows that these local-cultural factors are tied in Omaha, to some of the worst
urban-minority poverty and related socio-economic problems in the United States. This is
especially ironic and perhaps somewhat unexpected, as Omaha as an entity and a great many of
its citizens, see and tout themselves and their home-places (in a very incomplete and often
misleading community narrative) as virtually-utopian representations of “the good life” and
among the absolutely best places to live, raise families and conduct business anywhere in the
country and the entire world.
While important and useful in understanding the reality of poor social conditions, the vast
accumulations of quantitative data and statistical analyses generated in the U.S. during the past
50 years, about poverty and its effects, have actually provided little more than copious amounts
of “grist for the mill” of ideologically-driven debate and political conflict. Typically, the masses
of methodically-collected information on the subject has had very little impact in producing
meaningful and lasting improvements in the levels of poverty during the last five decades,
largely due to the irrationally competing and antagonistic, “values-driven” interpretations of the
very same data.
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In our view, better understandings of the “true nature” of community cultures and cultural
narratives (whether distorted, accurate or somewhere in between), has been a crucially-important
and largely-omitted key, to our finally addressing societal poverty comprehensively and
effectively. Such additional comprehension and knowledge can only be arrived at and attained,
however, through holistic investigations of the inter-related historical, social, economic, political,
psychological and other multi-disciplinary factors that create, comprise and perpetuate
community cultures and narratives.
B. PURPOSES OF THE STUDY AND OVERVIEW
This paper presents the findings of our first exploratory effort to re-examine the broad
community-cultural context in which poverty conditions for so many in Omaha and Nebraska,
have been constructed and maintained. Important findings from previous research conducted at
the University of Nebraska at Omaha and by others in various disciplines, provide a sturdy
platform on which we hope to continue to build, in combination with current poverty conditions
findings and analyses compiled by our research team.
The primary purposes of the study are three-fold. First, it examines previous key
qualitative and theoretical research findings that identify relevant, underlying community-culture
factors and narratives. It then combines these findings with additional quantitative and applied
poverty-related information, which continues to show Omaha’s “extremely poor” outcomes in
national urban-area comparisons, after 50 years of amelioration efforts.
Finally, this study provides specific recommendations and research questions to address
critical aspects of the community culture and narrative, especially as they have negatively
impacted poverty and related social problems. We hope that these recommendations and
18

research questions, based on and derived from the findings of this report, will be useful in
guiding future basic and applied research in these and other areas of investigation, as well as
informing cross-sectoral 18 efforts to develop, resource and implement new and improved antipoverty policies, programming initiatives, legislation, and structural reforms.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter II examines the nature and
importance of the “community culture” context, cultural archetypes and alternatives, significant
historical patterns in Omaha and how they have been shown to impact the effectiveness of
collaborative efforts to address poverty and related social problems. Chapter III first examines
and contrasts the information and indicators found in Omaha’s dominant community-culture and
narrative (promoted and enforced by key actors within the local power structure), with some of
the city’s unique and “extremely poor” poverty-related outcome indicators, that are totally
excluded or minimized in the narrative in a variety of ways
To conclude the paper, we then present poverty and community-culture related
recommendations and research questions, intended to improve social-problem-amelioration
performance and outcomes in Omaha. Our larger hopes are that these findings and examples
will also provide ideas and insights, to update and create a more-accurate and effective
community culture and narrative in Omaha, and wherever else they are needed. These
improvements are critically necessary to insure that all leaders, citizens and organizations, may
more-productively and finally, address severe poverty and the related social problems that are
currently being faced by a large and rapidly-growing proportion of the population.
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Between and/or involving private, public and nonprofit sectors.
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II. COMMUNITY CULTURE, NARRATIVES & IMPACTS ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS
“Community culture” is generally defined and understood as the concepts, memes,
beliefs, values, customs, practices, language, behaviors and institutions that help define a
particular population. For a variety of reasons and through multiple media over time, certain
stories are created and emerge that come to represent a group’s or population’s self- and shared
identities and values. These tales are commonly referred to as “community-culture” narratives
within academic disciplines such as sociology, cultural anthropology, social-psychology, history,
political-economics, etc. [Howard, 1991].
A more- specific and academic definition of “community-culture” and cultural narrative
employed in this study, is the one used by Patrick McNamara in his comparative study,
“Collaborative Success and Community Culture: Cross-Sectoral Partnerships Addressing
Homelessness in Omaha and Portland (2007).” (Due to space limitations here, readers of our
paper may want to view this study in its entirety at
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pubnum/3287859.html?FMT=AI, for more in-depth and additional

information on a variety of findings and operational definitions we reference.
In this model, additional definitional factors such as 1) community power, 2) social
capital and 3) political history are also considered, to create various typologies or archetypes that
are found in different cities and locations, which may then be used to more-accurately and
meaningfully understand and evaluate local community cultures and narratives. The moredetailed understandings and insights gained in this manner, especially related to the importance
of local contexts, are also critically necessary to assess community-culture impacts on other
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social phenomena, such as organized and collaborative efforts to address social problems like
poverty. 19
McNamara’s key findings and relevant, additional historical and current-conditions
information we have compiled, regarding the nature of community power, social capital and
political participation in Omaha are presented in the remainder of this chapter. The factors
presented are of critical importance in categorizing Omaha’s community culture and evaluating
its impacts on the ability of the system to address poverty and other social problems. In addition,
more qualitative information and evidence, provided in the comments and answers to structured
questions obtained in interviews with key-informants, that also typify and summarize the most
common and representative findings for each factor, are provided in italics.
A. COMMUNITY POWER IN OMAHA
Community Power has generally been defined as the intentional use of various resources
to exert a group’s collective will over others (Wrong, 1995: Domhoff, 2002). McNamara
modifies this definition somewhat in his work, in emphasizing that power is, “…a group’s ability
to use resources to achieve desired ends.” He also notes, most importantly in the study of
community culture, that the concept of power may be further refined as “power-over” as a form
of coercion or control (Follett, 1925) or as “power-with” which is more collaborative in nature
and practice (Fox and Urwich, 1993).

In this research, McNamara employed extensive interviews with numerous well-placed, experienced and
knowledgeable key informants, focus groups and a research methodology called “member checking” (Schwandt
2001, p, 155; Creswell, 2003, p.196) to corroborate and increase the validity of the findings.
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1. Elite/Private-Sector Leadership and Centrally-Controlled Decision-Making in Omaha
Since the city’s inception in 1854, a clear pattern of highly-centralized and concentrated
control and decision-making, wielded by a relatively-small group of elite and powerful leaders
(usually private-sector businessmen), has existed and persisted. In three major eras, 20 under
widely-different economic and social conditions, this defining factor of strong top-down, almost
exclusively private-sector leadership, has been shown to be the driving and controlling force in
Omaha’s development and performance. This factor is of primary importance in classifying
Omaha as a private-sector community culture (McNamara, 2007).
•

“If you look at every major [cross-sectoral] collaborative effort in the past, there has
always been some business leader at the forefront. We are fortunate to have six or seven
business leaders who do that [now in this era].”

•

“The first level of leadership is the four guys who run Omaha – Gottschalk, Scott, Yanney
and Stinson.”

•

“The common denominator in all successful collaboration is the business community.
Because there is philanthropic engagement, the business community has legitimacy in
this city.”

•

“It’s the five or ten white males who all sit on boards, run the corporations and are very
community minded.” “Personally, I’d rather work with five or six guys rather than a
broader group. It’s easier to ask them, ‘Will this happen?’ and they say ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’”

•

”On the surface it’s changed, but I’m not really sure it’s changed in its core. There are
still the major players around who run this city.”

•

“There was a former city councilman, John Miller, who was working on some economic
development issue at the Chamber. I met with him about some of the work we were doing
and he says, ‘Have you met with Walter Scott? You can’t do something like this in this
town without meeting with Walter Scott.”

The three (3) eras of elite, private-sector control in Omaha are: 1) Initial Omaha “Boosterism,” rampant elite
land-use speculation and development, Trans-Continental Railroad/Union Pacific Outside-Investor Control (18541897), 2) Political-Boss Tom Dennison’s Elite Power and Control for the Private Sector (1898-1931) and 3) Elite
Private-Sector and Corporate Control from Ak-Sar-Ben to Heritage Services (1932-Present). See (Larsen and
Cotrell, 1982, 1997; McNamara, 2007).
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“The Heritage Services 21 group – when they decide something is going to get done, it
will.”

•

2. Overriding Values of Economic Reductionism and Profit-Motives in Omaha Culture
While it might not be surprising that economic and financial gain are the dominant values
in a private sector community culture, the extent to which they override and undermine efforts to
address serious social problems like poverty in Omaha, is clear (McNamara, 2007). One insight
provided by a key informant intimately associated with the small, elite group controlling socialproblem-policy and -projects, summarized this weakness, which is identified by many other
sources in the study:
•

“The capital and the will have not been developed to address serious social problems
like poverty and affordable housing. You need to find an economics [based] model to
solve this problem, big investors [in philanthropy] and find a way for them to make
money on it.”
These same profit-making motives and values drive the major, elite donors’ and decision-

makers’ (who are largely concentrated in construction, architecture, design and finance
corporations) and shape the focus of charitable giving in Omaha (McNamara, 2007). Namely,
they expect a return on their investment (for which they have already or likely will receive tax
deductions), though this return is not exclusively a financial one, at least not in every instance.
However, the cumulative results are collaborations with the primary intent to construct many
buildings (some say way too many) and other infrastructure for the community, nonprofits and
government institutions. While tens or hundreds of millions of dollars might be spent on such a
single physical-infrastructure project in a given year, clearly and demonstrably-insufficient
The most recent incarnation of the continuous elite/private-sector leadership and control in Omaha for 160
years, from before the city’s formal/legal founding in 1856 through today.
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support is provided by the business elites for staffing, overhead, capacity-building, programming
and provision of direct services (Larsen and Cotrell, 1997; McNamara, 2007). Other comments
reflecting these findings are as follows:
•

“Power in Omaha is almost-completely economically driven. Power is money, power is
somehow overwhelmingly concentrated in the private-sector here.”

•

“In Omaha, the private sector tackles much more tangible issues and projects and drags
the government and nonprofit sectors along – in other words we build something –but do
not grapple with poverty or homelessness. We’re thinking cosmetically about physical
development and wealth creation for some, but not thinking systematically about all the
negative impacts it has on an equal number or more people, who are completely left out
of that single-minded and very limited, narrow focus.”

•

“Money is power. I think that the Nebraska culture and narrative goes back to the belief
that Nebraska was a pioneer community and that everyone here is from that stock, which
just isn’t true. People use that to say we have some sort of superior work ethic to justify
that all they think or care about is making more and more money.”

These findings are consistent with elite control and economic “growth machine” theories
(Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987), which reveal that economic self-interest and
maximization of financial gain for the elite, is the primary motivation behind private sector,
government and non-profit collaboration to develop land and construct buildings and
infrastructure. Other researchers have provided additional evidence to support growth-machine
theory, showing that public administrators and urban planners become tools of the elite, pushing
government subsidies of projects through economic tax breaks, such as Tax Increment Financing
(TIF) or other development mechanisms (Judd & Mendelson, 1973; Judd, 1988).
Examples of such growth-machine projects undertaken through private-public
collaborations, may focus on the development of local amenities (Whitt, 1987), such as new
convention centers, art and concert halls and sports facilities, to mention a few which are all very
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prominent in the Omaha landscape. 22 While some argue this development benefits the entire
community by creating employment (Peterson, 1981), critics point out that such a single-minded
focus on the generation of enormous profits for the economic elite, comes at the expense of the
poor (Waste, 1993; Box, 1998) and results in weaker governments and growing income and
wealth inequality within a community (Krugman, 2014).
3. Omaha’s and Nebraska’s Comparatively Weak and Ineffective Governments
Other effects of long-term, over-reliance on a small group of private-sector leaders for all
important community decision-making, policy development (including tax policy), infrastructure
and budgetary decisions, control of social-power networks (such as favored nonprofit agencies
and boards) and the distribution of jobs, incomes and other economic benefits, is that local and
state governments and nonprofit organizations will likely be relatively weak and ineffective in
addressing social problems and other matters (Lynd & Lynd, 1927; Hunter, 1953; Stone, 2005).
The observations of the key informants that follow are illustrative that this weakness is
the case, as identified through other research and historical data on Omaha’s city and Nebraska’s
state governments (Daly-Bednarek, 1992; Larsen & Cotrell, 1997; Omaha Community
Foundation, 1999):
•

“I think the culture of Omaha is that the private sector has a pretty tight grip on the
public sector. And they’ve used that to control the agenda.”

•

“You see, the leaders decide what issues to take on. There is an illness in our
community. It unintentionally stifles the more democratic institutions, the very ones that
might balance the corporate leaders.”

Recent “growth-machine” projects in Omaha include the $291 million CenturyLink/Qwest Convention Center
(2003), the $92 million Holland Center for the Performing Arts (2009) and the $132 million TD Ameritrade Baseball
Park (built to retain the NCAA College World Series in Omaha until at least 2035 if constructed).
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•

“Generally, over the years, the major community decisions have been made by people in
the corporate sector, the Captains of Industry. It’s the game of 6 or 10 or whatever.”

•

“Omaha has a history of being an aberration. Partly because we’ve had so many
entrepreneurs who have made big money here, they’ve taken over things that government
usually does.”

•

”There’s a perception that the city is controlled by a few people and input from the
nonprofit and human services community is not valued. There are a few private-sector
community leaders who drive the decisions in our city.”

•

“I believe that communities have this ‘muscle-memory.’ If you do it over and over again,
then it becomes automatic. And Omaha’s muscle-memory is that we are addicted to and
dependent on a group of private-sector people who ‘know better,’ addicted to a centrallycontrolled system. The results are not necessarily all negative, but it does negatively
affect the strength of our other public institutions.”

4. The Role of the “Free” Press in Public Policy and Social Control
A final factor of community power noted in this paper (and examined in more detail by
McNamara, 2007), is the role of the press serving as a tool of the elite to maintain power and
control in Omaha. Even prior to the City’s founding in1854, the business elite have continuously
used the local newspapers 23 in a “booster” capacity to advertise and promote Omaha as an “ideal
garden” for investment and opportunity (Larsen & Cotrell, 1997). Since its inception in 1889, 24
the Omaha World-Herald (the city’s only paper since 1937) has vigorously and continuously
pushed the views of the controlling business leaders and their agenda, virtually becoming the
embodiment of the Omaha elite (Darlstrom, 1988).

These early Omaha papers are The Arrow (June, 1854), the Nebraskian (1856), the Nebraskian and Times (1859),
the Nebraska Republican (1863), the Omaha Herald (1865), the Omaha Bee (1872), the Evening World (1885).
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The paper was founded in its present form through the merger of the Omaha Herald (1865) and the Omaha
World (1885).
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The paper was first taken into direct control and ownership by the major Omaha business
interests in 1962, when it was purchased by Peter Kiewit 25 to keep it in local hands and “save it”
from outside investors. Interestingly, the paper was purchased in 2012 by Warren Buffet, the
second-richest man in the U.S. and Berkshire-Hathaway (the multi-national conglomerate
holding company headquartered in Omaha) to “keep it a simple hometown newspaper.” The
following observations by key informants reflect only a small fraction of the influence the paper
still has on Omaha and Nebraska values, opinions and politics (McNamara, 2007):
•

“Remember that most of the money here is what I call ‘civic republican’ money……Just
look at the conservative, pro-business Omaha World-Herald editorial policy.”

•

“Today the influence of the Omaha World-Herald is very great. It has a strong voice in
supporting the existing power structure and its business agenda of the elite in
Omaha…..”

•

“When Hal Daub 26lied about the cost of helicopters and the Omaha World-Herald
brought in a lie-detector, that action was all John Gottschalk. That demonstrates how
strong the leadership of the privately-controlled press is here.”

B. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN OMAHA
Social capital was first popularly defined and expanded upon by Robert Putnam in his
works investigating the nature and status of civic engagement (1993, 1995 and 2000). Other
social scientists also contributed to and expanded the modern concept, noting that the function of
social capital (like that of physical infrastructure/factories and financial and human capital in the
production of goods and services) is to facilitate the productive achievement of particular
societal goals, outcomes and ends (Coleman, 1990; Edwards and Foley, 1999). A similar
working definition used by McNamara in his study is that, “Social capital consists of networks of
Founded by his father of the same name in 1884, Peter Keiwit headed the Keiwit Construction firm
headquartered in Omaha (incorporated in 1964) from 1924 until his death in 1979.
26
Former Omaha Mayor
25
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trust and the norms that exist in a community to be productively used by individuals and
organizations […to get things done that cannot otherwise be done].”
1. High Levels of Social Bonding and Low Levels of Social Bridging Capital
The networks of trust or connectedness that exist within some groups, such as those of
community leadership for example, exhibit extremely high levels of “social bonding” capital
(Putnam & Feldstein, 2003) and trust between the individuals that have been admitted and
accepted into the group. If a person or organization has these types of personal “connections,”
access to sufficient resources and opportunities in Omaha will very likely be made available by
those in power (Banfield & Wilson, 1963).
•

“Relationships between the leadership are tight. We’re still a small enough
community that corporate Omaha knows political Omaha very well. They are just
a phone call away.”

•

“We are a large small town. The power structure here knows each other and
basically supports each other. We can call the Mayor or Governor and actually
get a call back.”

•

“All these individuals have been here a long time. From the late ‘70s to the 90s,
we were the same players.”

The equally- or perhaps even more-negative downside of these very high-bonding
networks of trust, is that those not within or connected to certain groups, feel the extremely low
levels of “social bridging” social capital (Putnam & Feldstein, 2003). The resulting inability of
many or most individuals and organizations to have meaningful connections with “more-elite”
individuals and groups, creates the very-real and oppressive sense and atmosphere, that Omaha is
highly “fractional” and “fragmented” (McNamara 2003).
•

“Omaha is not as homogeneous as one might think. It is so factionalized here.”
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•

“If you graduated from Creighton or the University of Nebraska at Omaha
(UNO), you have a pair of wings around you that will help you get connected.
That makes it more difficult for outsiders, unless you’re bringing a lot of money to
invest in the community.”

•

“There are sanctioned pathways here in Omaha. This is a faith-based town,
highly affiliated. It has Roman Catholic roots and a strong base of
Evangelicals.”

•

“If you’re a white male and want to get involved – then it’s easier. Immigration
has been a big part of our city’s history. While it is easy to get involved, it is not
for outsiders.”

2. Social Norms and Unspoken Rules in Omaha
The “norms” and “unspoken rules” in Omaha manifest as “conservative” pressures to
live traditional lifestyles that include long-term hetero-sexual marriage, child-rearing, church
attendance, community volunteerism and/or donating to charities and causes, along with the
display of other expected values, attitudes, behaviors, duties and obligations. The over-riding
theme is that to rise to a level of affluence and influence in Omaha, persons need to conform to,
live within and abide by these normative systems and constraints (McNamara, 2007).
•

“To earn your stripes you need to have a traditional lifestyle, either a husband
with long-standing connections to the community, a debutant at Ak-Sar-Ben 27 or
independent wealth.”

•

“I learned that Omaha has a very conservative culture and is resistant to
change. They love to talk in progressive terms, but in reality they don’t like
change.”

•

“This is still very much a man’s town as far as women working goes. The glass
ceiling is welded in place. I don’t think the big boys have got that yet. There’s
still a huge elephant in the dining room.”

The 119-year old Knights of Ak-sar-ben organization was founded in 1895 by the Omaha Business Men’s
Association prior to and in anticipation of the work to be done to host the 1898 Trans-Mississippi Exposition in
Omaha. The Executive Committee comprised of members of Omaha’s elite business community soon emerged as a
driving force in Omaha’s leadership.
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3. Philanthropy and Social Networks as Mechanisms of Elite Control
As we began writing this sub-section of the “social capital” findings, we noted that the
first two factors discussed here (social bonding and bridging; and norms and unspoken rules) are
highly inter-twined with and inseparable from the “community power and control” factors
discussed in the first section of this chapter. At this point, upon reviewing all the communityculture findings, it became clear to us, that each of the 11 sub-factors identified and discussed in
this chapter, in the three areas of A) Community Power, B) Social Capital and C) Political
History, have very strong of elements and play an active role and in maintaining economic,
political and social control by the elite.
Through the decades, private-sector leaders and their followers, employees and
collaborating individuals and institutions have employed a variety of mechanisms to gain and
maintain power and control of others in Omaha (Larsen & Cotrell, 1997). Eikenberry (2007)
notes that even philanthropy, through control of its boards and social networks, the determination
of the type and nature of funded projects, the levels of funding and in other ways, can be a
mechanism of elite community power and social control. The following comments by key
informants illustrate this point:
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•

“Gottschalk 28said to me one day, ‘Heritage Services is the Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval for all fundraising projects.’ There are six or seven members of that board who
decide what projects go. They control not just personal resources, but influence over
others. There are some people who just won’t give unless asked by those guys.”

•

“Decisions come from one of these individual leaders, taking their turns. One person
makes a gift or calls in a favor from a politician. Decisions start with one individual then
he calls in the chits for others.”

•

“The Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben have diminished over the years, but still civic involvement is
prized and required. People who want to rise to the top of the pyramid have to serve and
give resources back to the community.”

Gottschalk was the former editor and publisher of the Omaha World-Herald.
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•

“Corporate and small-business leaders and even their employees are pressured to be
civically engaged. If you are a titan or a regular citizen, there are strong expectations
that you will give back.”

4. Structural Racism, Sexism and Other Forms of Exclusion in Omaha
Other forms of social control by the elite are related to the access that is allowed to
people of color, women, nonprofit and social service leaders, government officials and other
“outsiders” (McNamara, 2007). While some in Omaha insist that these forms of discrimination
and exclusion do not even exist anymore in this city, this following comments by key informants
provides strong evidence that this is certainly not the case:
•

”There are folks who would like to see it change because there’s this notion that
good ‘ol boys make this happen in Omaha. But there’s no good ‘ol girls here.
Most don’t see us as race and gender diverse.”

•

”The leadership clique here has been and still is ALL white male.”

•

“The common perception is that you can’t be a leader in your own right if you’re
black.”

•

“Nonprofit leaders and managers are not held in high regard by private business.
There’s a bias that doesn’t recognize incredible, outstanding nonprofit-sector
leaders and people.”

•

“I would say that the nonprofit sector is not viewed by the business community as
elevated to a level that is valuable to the community.”

•

“The disadvantaged, working-poor and their advocates get left out of most and
the most-important collaborations. The greatest amount of local collaboration
always takes place between and among the rich and powerful.”

•

“After LB 416 passed by such a large margin, I knew why as a gay man I hadn’t
been able to access so much of and wasn’t accepted by this community.”

•

“It is far easier for the traditional elites to build buildings than it is to talk to gays
or about gay efforts to attain fair treatment and equality.”
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•

“Latinos are stuck at the middle manager level. Omaha is letting them know
they’re ‘not quite ready yet.’ They keep us where we have a place at the table,
but it’s not a visible position and it’s always at “their table,” not at everyone’s
table. It’s because many Latinos don’t vote, so there’s no return for their
money.”

•

“I don’t ever get to be in the same room as the corporate leadership. The
corporations are just not there. The true community-based organizations get tired
of ‘the white man’ –that’s what we call them—throwing money at them and telling
them what to do.”

•

“It’s easy for some people to get involved if they have money or a high-profile job
with a corporation or university. It’s harder for the up and coming young person.
There are invisible enclosures which are mostly relational and if you are a little
more liberal, it may seem like you are always on the outside.”

C. POLITICAL HISTORY IN OMAHA
Political history is the third aspect of community culture to be considered, which
McNamara further refines among three sub-indicators: 1) citizen participation, 2) control of
public process and policy 29 and 3) leadership. He also notes that understanding the political
history of a locale is especially important in accurately classifying the type of community-culture
under study. With this historical context in hand, the roles and relative strengths of the public
sector, government and nonprofit officials and administrators can more-completely be evaluated
and compared to the private sector, their representatives and other key actors.
1. Citizen Participation
McNamara (2007) notes that high levels of citizen participation and meaningful firsthand involvement in the democratic decision-making process, as occurs in Portland [Oregon], is
a defining characteristic of public-sector community cultures, as opposed to private-sector

McNamara specifically cites land-use planning, development and valuation decisions, as examples of how control
of these by the private-sector elites, defines and impacts public/private “collaborations” in Omaha.
29
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cultures where major decisions are controlled and made by a small, elite as in Omaha. For
citizens to acquire greater and more-significant democratic participation, many factors such as:
1) politicians and public administrators creating more avenues for real involvement, 2) higher
expectations by citizens that participation is a fundamental right and 3) holding both the public
and private leaders of the local power-structure accountable for bad decisions and poor social
and economic outcomes are necessary.
While currently the evidence is clear that meaningful access to and citizen participation
in the highest levels of decision-making in Omaha is impossible at this time, actions and changes
are possible that would certainly improve the situation. Most importantly, despite the fact that
Omaha has had tightly-controlled leadership by small, elite groups of very powerful and wealthy
men for 160 years since its inception, the reality is that all communities are in “states of
continual transition” (Sinclair, 2002).
In our era of perpetual local and national crises, there are constantly arising new windows
of opportunity (Lober, 1997; Takahashi & Smutny, 2002) for change, inter-sectoral collaboration
and improvement, if we only have the awareness, skills and knowledge to be able to see and take
advantage of them. This is particularly true in times of growing turmoil and chaos, as we see
now in Omaha and Nebraska, with rapidly spreading poverty (especially child poverty) into nontraditionally poor areas and the white suburbs (Drozd, 2014) , a severe lack of adequate mental
and physical healthcare, social services and other support (Voices for Children & Nebraska
Appleseed, 2013) continually high levels of violence and disproportionate minority confinement
and the seriously-dysfunctional and ineffective Nebraska Departments of Health and Human
Services and the Nebraska Department of Corrections (Omaha World Herald, 2014), to mention
just a few.
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The following comments by key informants provide additional data substantiating these
conditions and the opportunities they present for change in elements of the community-culture
that created them in the first place:
•

“There are a lot of organizations that citizens can be involved in. But at the higher
level, it is not possible. There are minor and major boards, and then there are the elite
boards. There’s a high level of control at the elite level.”

•

“Getting elected to office has particular barriers. The City Council and State Legislature
don’t really pay anything, so you need substantial resources of your own to live, and
that’s a strong deterrent for most common people to get involved and run.”

•

“To work well together you need to have a relationship based on mutual respect that is
equal or close to equal. That is definitely NOT the case in Omaha….because the
relationship is way out of balance here, because the corporations and wealthy so
dominate.”

•

“I sometimes perceive that there is a small group of community leaders that think they
know what is best for the community and they operate as they want, with no participation
by or input from Omaha’s citizens.”

•

“Race is a very difficult subject in Omaha that affects group relations, power and
decision-making, in ways that are difficult to discern from the outside…..but that are
obvious patterns of exclusion from the outside.”

•

“We are remarkably segregated in all ways in Omaha. Visitors from other cities see and
comment on this and I know it hurts Omaha’s reputation. Don’t our leaders see or care
that this is a major problem?”

•

“There is a deep culture of poverty in Omaha that no one wants to admit even exists, let
alone working on seriously to solve.”

2. Private-Sector Control of Public Process and Policy in Omaha
Growth machine theory holds that elite groups control local government decisions to
maximize economic benefits to themselves, their members and/or employees and followers
(Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987). Political decisions, for example those related to
proposed public/private construction projects, endorsed by the elite/corporate leaders who stand
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to gain the most monetarily from them, are regularly supported and approved by politicians
(whose political campaigns have been supported by the private developers) and are then
implemented by public administrators. Although the local booster-narrative is that this is a
model of public-private-nonprofit inter-sectoral partnership and collaboration, this largelyconcealed process often ends up being little more than, “…an insulated, elitist activity in which
residents, neighborhood groups, grass-roots community organizations and individual citizens are
not viewed as essential or explicit to these initiatives” (Turner, 2002).
Omaha takes on capital projects [physical construction/infrastructure/buildings] because
they are often easier to accomplish than finding solutions to complex social issues and fit well in
a city where architects, engineers and construction companies have been part of the corporate
elite for generations (McNamara, 2004).
•

“There’s a good working partnership between the City and corporate leaders. If you
want something built, which is what we do most and best, those are the builders.”

•

“In this community, a successful effort, whether it’s physical construction or social
betterment, has to be initiated in the private sector. While the City of Omaha used to have
more impact I think, nothing seems to happen now without corporate leadership.”

•

“People grasp on some level what I believe fundamentally….government here is a fairly
small piece of the equation. Amazingly, local government in Omaha is not the forum for
getting public choices made.”

•

“I see the culture of City government as reactionary. The vision is that the corporate
community is driving everything. No longer is the City involved with every big initiative
at the start like it should be.”
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3. Political Leadership
As has been clearly demonstrated throughout this paper, the elite leadership of Omaha
has primarily been private-sector “heavy weights,” who have obtained and retained tight control
for all but of few of the sixteen (16) decades the city has existed, and even in those 35 years, they
were very close to the city’s political “Boss” Tom Dennison (see Section A, page 11). As times
and conditions have changed however, even these business leaders have changed in type, from
early land speculators and developers, entrepreneurs, small and large businessmen and early
industrial magnates, to an era of business control and political domination by corporate leaders
(McNamara, 2007).
One of McNamara’s important conclusions in his research, is that a challenge in
improving community cultures and inter-sectoral collaborations, is the false notion that one
sector can completely dominate all others. To have a healthy, prosperous, fully-functioning and
well-integrated community “….one sector alone cannot sustain a community.” The final
comments in this chapter add to and amplify these sentiments:
•

“The collaborative efforts may seem good on the surface, but in actuality they are not
effective. People soothe their souls by saying we work together, but the reality is that
they don’t accomplish that much.”

•

“They mindset is completely different. There are completely different bottom lines for
business, government and nonprofits.”

•

“The linkages between the different sectors are just not there. We could close half the
nonprofits in Omaha and not miss them, the vast majority are left out of meaningful
participation.”
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•
•

“The public sector brings a little less enthusiastic response to the nonprofit sector than
does the private sector. In some ways, they are competing for the same dollars and to be
seen as successful.”
“When resources are limited, the partnerships are more important. Like right now
there’s a feeling in the City government that we can’t do anymore because there’s no
money. Ten or fifteen years ago, there were more resources in City government and they
were better partners.”

•

“There’s so much money in this community that’s going to turn over in a short amount of
time, it is almost beyond belief. But still there’s a sense of ‘We can’t because there’s no
money.’ The City should be a real and initiating player on many projects – they
shouldn’t always be looking to private corporations and foundations for direction.”

•

“I think the sectors don’t work as well together because there’s suspicion – what do you
want from this? Am I going to lose? Are they just asking for money?”

•

“Building trust is the most difficult thing in collaboration. But it is also the most
important thing. In the past, the community culture was about looking at the whole, sadly
that is no longer the case”

.
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III. OMAHA’S COMMUNITY-CULTURE NARRATIVE VS. OMAHA’S REALITY
Thus far, this paper has mainly explored the definitional nature of community cultures
and narratives, based on the literature and some of the key findings of a thorough and important
comparative study of two cities’ cultures (Omaha, NE and Portland, OR), one “private sector”
and one “public sector” (McNamara, 2007). While these findings were generally based on morequalitative (subjective) information and intended primarily for use in theory exploration and
development, we now turn our attention to further examination of Omaha’s community-culture
and narrative, presenting additional more-quantitative (objective) data as it relates to both.
A. THE “VIRTUALLY-UTOPIAN” NARRATIVE OF OMAHA
As mentioned in the introduction, Omaha’s community-culture narrative has (since the
city’s founding) and does, paint a portrait of Omaha that it is unquestionably among the best
places in the U.S. and indeed the world, to live, raise families and conduct business. In this
section, we present information about Omaha and its national rankings on a variety of
community factors, many of which would support these claims for a large segment of the city’s
population, for whom these data are accurate representations of many aspects of their lives.
Table 1 presents a side by side comparison of some of Omaha’s best and worst conditions’
rankings and pertinent information that demonstrates why many refer to the city as “The Two
Omaha’s.”
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Table 1
Best and Worst Conditions Rankings and Indicators for Greater Omaha [Nebraska]
OMAHA’S BEST CONDITIONS
OMAHA’S BEST CONDITIONS
RANKINGS & INDICATORS
RANKINGS & INDICATORS
(Source)
(Source)
#3

Best Cities to Start a Business

#3

(Nerdwallet.com)

Highest U.S. Black Poverty Rate
(100 Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas)

(U.S. Census Bureau)

#1 New and Expanding Facilities

#1 Highest U.S. Black-Children Poverty Rate

(MSA’s 200,000 – 1 Million)

(100 Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas)

(Site Selection Magazine)

(U.S. Census Bureau)

#1 Top 10 Best Cities to Raise a Family

#2 Highest U.S. Rate of Placing Children in
Foster Care 30

(Movoto Blog)
#3

(U.S. Department Health and Human Services)

Number of Economic Development
Projects

#1 Highest U.S. Black Homicide Victimization
Rate

(MSA’s 200,000 – 1 Million)

(Violence Prevention Center)

(Site Selection Magazine)
#2 America’s 10 Best Cities for Professional
Women

#4

#2 Highest Percentage of Hourly Workers
Earning at or Below Minimum Wage 31

(Motovo Blog)

(U.S. Department of Labor)

Top 50 Military-Friendly Cities

#2 Lowest U.S. Eligibility Level for Childcare
Assistance for Low-Income Working Families 32

This ranking is for the state of Nebraska with the vast majority of placements occurring in families in Omaha.
The ranking is within the mid-western geographic region.
32
Based on the percentage of the official U.S. Poverty Level set by the state of Nebraska (and translated into
dollars).
30
31
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(G.I. Jobs)

(Nebraska Appleseed Center)

#1 Least Financial Stress on Households

#2

(Credibility.org)

Widest Economic Disparity Between Black
and White Residents
(Omaha World-Herald)

#1 Best City for Cheapskates

#1 Highest U.S. Black Arrest Rates for
Marijuana Possession

(Kiplinger, 2013)

(American Civil Liberties Union, 2013)

While the disparate pictures of the best and worst rankings of conditions in Omaha
presented in Table 1 are by no means comprehensive, they do offer a glimpse of the dominant,
local community-culture narrative that is most-widely used to portray what life and conditions
are like in the city. The best conditions rankings in the left-hand column (five out of seven being
business or economic-conditions related) were all obtained from the Greater Omaha Chamber of
Commerce website and such items are also regular front-page news in the Omaha World-Herald
newspaper. Both of these institutions having been the very embodiments and tools of the Omaha
business elite for decades (see Chapter II, Section A, 4, page 12).
The social problems and poor conditions, listed in the worst rankings in the right-hand
column, are also covered in the World-Herald, but typically are downplayed through a variety of
techniques, especially when compared to how the always-positive, economic-success stories and
rankings are presented. The problematic issues and related dysfunctions in human-service
provision and program performance in state government (especially in the Nebraska Department
of Health and Human Services and Nebraska Department of Corrections over the past ten years),
are typically portrayed in news stories and on the editorial page, as areas where Omaha and/or
the state are now “making great progress” or are “finally on the right track.”
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This “great progress” in addressing poverty and related-problems, according to the
World-Herald, has supposedly and continuously been made during the course of the past 50
years, and yet inexplicably, we find that conditions for the poor and disadvantaged in Omaha are
as bad as they ever were, and in some cases even worse. The decades-old campaign by the
newspaper, to subtly minimize and marginalize the growing crises in the minority and poor
communities, was perhaps unwittingly exposed in a recent human-interest column in the WorldHerald, written by one of the its premiere, self-proclaimed Omaha boosters and enthusiasts. 33
In an interview with Robert Frick, the director of the rankings project for Kiplinger’s
business and financial magazine (which had rated Omaha “America’s Top Value City” several
years earlier), the interviewee condescendingly described north Omaha (home to a majority of
black citizens and other residents of the city) as “Omaha’s Achilles’ heel.” Citing the area’s high
crime and unemployment rates, Frick detachedly observed, “If Omaha could just fix north
Omaha, if you guys could solve that [little] problem, Omaha could almost be mythical.”
We suppose that attaining “mythical” status is not beyond the insatiable aspirations of the
elite, business leaders of Omaha, as it would greatly transcend what we have described as their
“virtually-utopian” community-culture narrative, which they themselves created and continually
perpetuate. What is not mentioned in Omaha’s narrative, however is that previous generations of
Omaha’s leadership, through their social, economic and business policies and practices, played a
determining role in the nearly-complete annihilation of what was, at one time, a thriving and
growing black middle-class community (Larsen & Cottrell, 1997; et al). 34

33

See Omaha World-Herald, January 21, 2014; Michael Kelly column, page 2B.

Historians Larsen and Cotrell and others describe the destruction of the black middle-class as primarily accruing
to four (4) economic and social policies pursued by Omaha’s leadership in the early and middle part of the 20th
34

41

B. THE REALITY OF OMAHA’S EXCLUDED AND DAMAGED COMMUNITIES
The horrendous impacts of poverty affect all of us in Omaha. Some here, unfortunately, are
seemingly content to believe that people in poverty are older men, who are addicted to drugs or
alcohol (or both), have a mental illness and/or are almost certainly poor due to their lack of
personal ambition, character flaws and the avoidable bad choices they made during their
lifetimes.
While these simplistic beliefs and myths have largely been debunked by the social sciences
and human-service professionals, some of the realities of poverty here are: that one in five or
20% of Omaha’s children live in poverty every day; 30,000 Nebraskans are at risk of
homelessness; and at one local Omaha elementary school, 80% of the students live at or below
the poverty line. Families in poverty have doubled since 2000 in this area. To explore these
themes and the facts about poverty in more detail, we first will look more closely at the history
and implementation of poverty remediation measures in the U.S. and other occurrences, and also
at actions and policies in Omaha and Nebraska that have been anything but, helpful or remedial.
1. The History and Current Context of Anti-Poverty Measures in the U.S. and Omaha
To gain needed perspective and greater contextual understanding of some of the real roots of poverty,
we must revisit some not-too-distant United States’ history. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the U.S.
government initiated the Social Security Act (SSA) nearly 80 years ago to keep vast numbers of widows,
Century: 1) the closure and re-organization of the meat-packing and railroad industries in Omaha that had a
devastating impact on black and minority employment, 2) comprehensive racial discrimination against blacks
which did not allow them to live or obtain housing outside a small area (ghetto) in north Omaha (where a majority
of black citizens still reside), 3) discrimination in hiring blacks to work on the construction of the Interstate
Highway System and other construction projects in the 1950’s and later and 4) the successful efforts of Omaha’s
leaders to largely exclude the federal government and its anti-poverty programs from having a strong leadership
presence in Omaha (to ensure the elite’s continuing complete dominance in policy and power) during the early
1960s and 1970s, that provided a wide array of services and benefits (including the development of a professional
class) to blacks in cities across the U.S.
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children and older adults (whose care and support was far beyond the financial means and organizational
capacity of churches and charities) out of poverty; in 2014, similar or worse poverty and living conditions
still exist in the U.S.

Furthermore, each state under the SSA was to furnish financial assistance to needy and
dependent children. The Great Depression of the 1930’s led Americans toward the reality-based
understanding that absolutely no individual or family was immune to or protected from financial
ruin. There was a feeling in the country during that horrible crisis, that everyone was
experiencing the same traumatic issues and no individual’s personal choices were to blame (the
still popular among some groups, blaming the victim mentality and politics). FDR and his allies
were hopeful that the SSA would assist women, children, the aged and disabled from hitting rock
bottom and being anymore damaged than they already were. Why then, hasn’t this greatly
popular and needed social-insurance program been more successful in reducing and even
eliminating, all poverty and related-problems for more poor families and children?
In Nebraska, Republican Governor Dave Heineman has denied federally-funded Medicaid
expansion three times, which was made available to the states at no initial cost, as a result of the
congressionally-approved Affordable Care Act,; denied access to critically-necessary driver
licenses for authorized young people under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA);
was even against taxpayer-funded pre-natal care for undocumented immigrants and is also
against granting in-state tuition to children of undocumented immigrants. The economic growth
of rural areas in Nebraska can largely be attributed to immigrants, both documented and
undocumented, having saved many of these small Nebraska towns through their hard work and
productivity, from being blown away like bird’s nests in a Nebraska dust storm.
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Therein lies the issue, if it were only funding that was needed to bring people out of poverty,
perhaps the issue and crisis would have been solved long ago. Barusch (2011) stated that to a
large extent, poverty is the direct result of governmental policies. She states that tax breaks for
the wealthy decrease revenue for programs that low-income seniors, families and children rely
upon to survive, and even then, very poorly or just barely. Upon closer examination of Governor
Heineman’s idealogically- and politically-driven policies, one could also add a clearly-targeted
aim at immigrant and undocumented populations.
The goal of any sound, social policy, is to ensure that it is universal and comprehensive
versus residual and fragmented. The complex web of poverty and careful examination of which
actions really do have meaningful impacts, must also include a universal and comprehensive
understanding the many traumas of being poor in this country. There is an example that is
referred to quite often regarding access to resources; where one lives affects where one goes to
school, which then impacts what type of employment you’ll have, which then leads back to
where one can live, based on the salary you receive, etc. In the recent past, there has been much
attention given to military personnel regarding Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). If you
have experienced any severe trauma or a life threatening event, it is quite possible and even
likely, that you may develop symptoms of PTSD. All persons under these conditions and the
stresses can result, may feel like their life or the lives of others are in great danger or that they
have no control at all over what is happening.
Just listen to the life stories of homeless women, men and children. An Omaha
elementary school principal says that he knows that many of his children are living in homeless
shelters and he is aware of the great difficulties they face each day when they leave school. He
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says that he surrounds these children with people who care about them. Several local non-profit
organizations in Omaha initiated a backpack program for children in an after school program
years ago. The director stated that the children would comment that they didn’t have enough to
eat at home over the weekends, or that the food was for their younger siblings. Why is it
necessary that we have programs such as these, which are usually under-funded and temporary,
in the richest country in the world? Why do we need to have them in Omaha, which is the home
of more Fortune 500 companies per capita than any other city in the U.S.? Why do we need
them in this city which also boasts more millionaires and billionaires per capita, than any other
city in the U.S.?
Jonathon Kozol wrote numerous books regarding education and children, including
Savage Inequalities and Saving Grace. He stated that our goal should be to make our U.S. public
schools so wonderful that our children hate to leave school each day. Instead, we find that we
have many public school systems that actually destroy young minds and motivation, students that
don’t graduate and often become easy targets for a dysfunctional and ineffective corrections
system. A new report released by the federal Department of Education points out one of the
systemic barriers that disproportionally impacts children and youth of color are harsh school
discipline policies, often referred to as the ‘school to prison pipeline.’ Voices for ChildrenNebraska released data referring to this pipeline by analyzing out-of-school suspensions for
Nebraska students (2011-2012); the findings of greatly-disproportionate treatment of minorities,
as shown in the tables below, are sobering and disturbing, especially with regard to African
American youth.

45

46

All data from the Civil Rights Data Snapshot, US Dept. of Education

Many Nebraska schools are accomplishing just the opposite of what Kozol proposes.
Unfortunately, and with some certainty these data are not new to African American families,
whose students have been dismissed summarily for many years. These findings then beg the
discussion leading to intergenerational poverty. Inter-generational poverty is the result of
multiple-generations of individuals and families who are impoverished.
“A cycle of poverty that starts with one adult or family continues through successive
generations and only gets worse, especially as we can now clearly see, that workers’ real wages
have not increased since the 1970s” (Global Research, January 2011). How does a country as
rich in resources and both economic and human capital as the United States, have many large
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and growing populations who experience inter-generational poverty? In a press release dated
September 18, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted to propose a new rule that
would require public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their chief executive
officer to the median wage of its employees. The average CEO-to-worker pay ratio in 2102 was
an incredible 350 to 1. This point of information is staggering, and it clearly points to one of the
main underlying reasons why so many in the U.S. suffer inter-generational poverty.
National headlines on a daily basis show how disproportionate the numbers are for
people of color in U.S. corrections systems. Drucker (2013) presents the issue of mass
incarceration akin to an epidemic disease. His analysis utilizes tools of epidemiology which
sheds new light on examining this life-threatening issue to many individuals, communities and
families.
His research contends that there is a direct connection between mass incarceration and
later public health problems, which are further linked to inherent inequalities and impacts on
children. Thus, Drucker creates as the foundation of this work, an analysis of individual and
environmental characteristics and the intersection of both, in order to make sense of a large-scale
problem and a necessary predecessor to its prevention.
He concludes that: ‘‘Epidemic mass incarceration has become one of the most powerful
determinants of systematic and inter-generational inequality in our society’’ (p. 162). The
ensuing goal, then being a prevention model aimed at reducing mass incarcerations, eventually
leading to the elimination of unnecessary inequalities that disproportionately impact children and
people of color.
Cullen, Wright and Chamlin (1999) have similar insights to those of Drucker and suggest
the following:
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“These narratives, moreover, would seek to connect biography and social structure, and
how individuals, caught in a web of neglect and disadvantage, are placed at risk for a life
in crime. Finally, the punch line of the story would be that by creating a more supportive
society and by giving concrete support to individuals, much crime [and mass
incarceration] would be prevented” (pp. 197-198).
The 2013 U.S. Census estimates that Nebraska’s population is 1.8 million. The Omaha
Douglas County population is estimated at 537,256 or nearly 30% of the total population of the
state. Omaha is home to five Fortune 500 companies: Berkshire Hathaway, ConAgra Foods,
Union Pacific, Peter Kiewit Sons' and Mutual of Omaha. Henry Cordes, a staff writer for the
Omaha World Herald wrote:
“Using the federal government’s broadest definition of what constitutes a metropolitan
area, a World Herald analysis shows that Omaha is home to more Fortune 500 companies
per capita than any major metro area in the nation. Using a narrower definition of a metro
area, Omaha ranks no worse than third. It trails only Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk
Conn., the affluent burbs in the shadow of New York City, and San Jose Calif., the heart
of Silicon Valley.” (Omaha World Herald, February 3, 2013).
For people outside of this metropolitan area, Omaha may appear to be a utopia in the
middle of the country with resources readily available to counter attack any socio-economic
condition that is present in the area. According to research conducted by McNamara (2007),
Omaha’s economic and political will, led by a few good businessmen, have used their
cumulative economic assets and interests to “set the stage” for this city. In his interview with
several educational, community and business leaders, there was consistent agreement that if
anything was to be successful, one just needed to offer ‘a name.’ If these business leaders were
behind the proposal, then it would certainly be ‘successful’, if not, it would ‘fail.’
However, several recent attempts to reduce or eliminate poverty, championed by the
high- profile, elite leaders in this community over the past several years, have met with little
success or failed outright. Perhaps in these failures we may be seeing the first cracks in the myth
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of invincibility, that has supported the social, economic and political control of Omaha by its
private-sector, corporate elites. As we saw in the findings presented in Chapter II, it is far easier
to engage in land- and economic development and construct buildings and physical
infrastructure, than it is to successfully address and cope with the complexity and difficulties
inherent in social problems such as poverty.
One must ask the question, with all these massive resources, people who care about the
struggles of the disadvantaged and smart advocates, why does Nebraska struggle with child
poverty rates at 18% (the highest in the entire U.S.) and single-parent families with related
children that are below poverty at a rate of 34%; adults and children receiving welfare (TANF)
number 16,597; children receiving food stamps 82,000 and 223,269 children enrolled in
Medicaid and CHIP (Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity, 2014)? Unfortunately, these data
highlight the discrepancies between the perceptual universe of Omaha’s Fortune 500 companies
and the world of Nebraskans and Omaha residents who struggle in poverty every day.
Building Bright Futures (BBF) was organized in 2006 by Omaha leaders and
philanthropists to address issues impacting poor children and their families. The goals included
that within five years, every poor child in Douglas and Sarpy County would have health care,
tutors and mentors, and the opportunity to go to college. The organization spent about $7 million
dollars a year donated by Omaha philanthropists. One of the most intriguing goals of BBF was
that public policy regarding poverty would be highlighted and the discussion would lead to every
poor child being as well equipped as possible to face the challenges of being poor.
This was a huge miscalculation on the part of Omaha’s elite and philanthropists, as the
human-services professionals who work in the field and the social scientist who study it well
know, poverty is a very, very difficult monster to kill. The analysis regarding public-policy
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issues related to poverty was the right approach; the implementation efforts and what it takes to
reduce or end poverty is something quite different. These ameliorations would include morecomparable wages and incomes throughout the city (Nebraska’s minimum wage, received by a
majority of Omaha’s working poor families, is a paltry $7.25 per hour); universal healthcare,
affordable and available transportation and housing, and an educational system with highlyskilled personnel who are trained to work with families who are experiencing inter-generational
poverty.
2. Catastrophic State Government Failures Responsible for Worsening Poverty
As with the first clear signs of failures by Omaha’s elite, private-sector leadership, to
successfully address poverty and the related-problem of poor educational outcomes, the first of
many ensuing catastrophic failures by state government, also took place at about the same time.
Legislative Bill 157 was introduced in the Nebraska Unicameral in the 2008 Legislative Session,
and was passed on Final Reading, February 7, 2008 by the vote of 41-1-7.
The full text of LB 157 reads: “No person shall be prosecuted for any crime based solely
upon the act of leaving a child in the custody of an employee on duty at a hospital licensed by the
State of Nebraska. The hospital shall promptly contact appropriate authorities to take custody of
the child.” LB 157 did not specify an age limit for which a person could drop off a child at a
hospital and not be prosecuted. The bill was intended to protect newborns from being abandoned
or killed by distraught parents, and Nebraska was the last of the fifty states to enact legislation
known as “Safe Haven” laws.
Between September and November 21, 2008, when the governor signed the revision of
the law, LB1 of the Special Session of the Legislature, 35 children were dropped off at Nebraska
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hospitals, the majority being between 10-17 years of age. No infants were left. The hasty
revision of the law amended the original bill to state that parents of infants under 30 days of age
were protected from prosecution. In the weeks prior to November 21st, children and adolescents
were abandoned by their parents and caretakers in hospital emergency rooms, sometimes telling
the children, but often not. Adolescents were flown or driven to Nebraska from Florida,
Georgia, Michigan, Indiana, and Iowa, in addition to the many local families who could not
provide for the physical and mostly mental health needs of their children.
One Omaha father dropped off nine children, ages 1-17, stating that he was overwhelmed
since the death of his wife following the birth of the youngest child. A divorced mother of three
left her 11 year old son with bi-polar disorder at a rural hospital after a weekend of violent
episodes, and discharge from the three-day-only stay allowed, by state law, at a mental health
inpatient facility. The child “promised to be good” as she tearfully left, feeling that she had no
other hope, after the state government’s mental-and-behavioral health system had failed her and
her child in every way possible.
A profile of the majority of the 35 children left under the Safe Haven law, conducted by the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, found that:
•
•
•
•

27 had a history of mental health treatment
22 had parents with a history of incarceration
28 were from single parent homes
20 were white, 7 were black

In 2008, 6,600 children were in the custody of the State of Nebraska, making it the
second highest ratio of children in state care in the U.S. Also at that time, there were only six
practicing child psychiatrists in the entire state, and the mental health services for children and
adolescents were scarce, unaffordable, and difficult to access. The majority of older children left
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under the Safe Haven laws had extensive histories of mental-health needs, and few, if any had
resources to meet them. The parents and caretakers viewed the law as their only opportunity for
their children to finally receive care as the last resort, and therefore abandoned their children for
safekeeping by the state, which was the original intent of the Safe Haven legislation.
Since November 21, 2008, the revised Safe Haven law allows for the leaving of a child
under-30 days of age for care by the state. Services for the needs of children and adolescents
with mental-health conditions and other needs have not appreciably improved (and likely, due to
a highly-destructive and extremely-costly failure by the Republican governor to “privatize” state
services to reduce spending), 35 they have greatly worsened. Despite the crisis revealing the
extent of the NHHS dysfunction in providing critically-needed services to poor families, the
revision of the law, sadly, eliminated desperate parents’ last recourse in Nebraska, when all their
efforts had failed to garner vital services from the state for their children.
As a backdrop to the nationally reported Safe Haven events, the child welfare system in
Nebraska was undergoing enormous changes. In early 2002, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services stated in a report that Nebraska failed to achieve “substantial conformity” with
the seven safety, permanency and well-being measures for children in the care of the state. In
2003 the governor created a task force to address caseworker workload and retention issues,
appropriating over $5.5 million to fund new social service workers in 2004. Despite increased
funding, Nebraska continued to have one of the highest rates of children in out-of-home care,
and HHS was sued by the Nebraska Appleseed Center for the Law in the Public Interest and the
As reported by the Omaha World-Herald, information gathered in an investigation conducted by the Nebraska
State Legislator into the disastrous, privatization initiative driven by the Republican administration, revealed that
privatization has resulted in an additional $75 million in direct expenditures. The study also found that additional
$75 million or more in other costs, due to the loss of valued and experienced state staff, other system-wide
impacts and remediation efforts for affected families, will be forthcoming in future years.
35
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New York based Children’s Rights, stating that HHS endangered the over 6,000 children in the
“mismanaged, overburdened and under-funded” foster care system.
Unfortunately, the lawsuit was dismissed, and the governor issued directives to improve
the child welfare system, focused on decreasing the length of time children spent before
achieving permanent placements. The number of children in the foster care system went from
7,803 in April to 7,603 in July, and was characterized as “dramatic progress” by the governor
and on the Omaha World-Herald opinion page. He restructured the Department of Health and
Human Services a few months later, creating a Division of Children and Family Services.
In December 2007 a report was issued by the Children’s Behavioral Health Task Force, a
group of legislators, HHS staff and child welfare advocates, stating that the goal of the new
system was to reduce 7,000 state wards with 70% in out-of-home care to 5,000 wards with 70%
in in-home care by 2011. This was to be accomplished by the privatization of the child welfare
system (as discussed above), shifting the responsibility from the state to private contractors in
June 2009. The goals were to enhance efficiency and accountability while controlling the costs
of the failing system. As we have seen, it was another spectacular failure in the state, this time
by public-sector rather than private-sector leadership, to address poverty and related problems.
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IV. STUDY FINDINGS AND ANALYSES, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As we have seen, the long-standing control of Omaha’s economic, social and political
spheres by generations of small, powerful, elite-circles of wealthy businessmen, spanning three
different historical eras, has produced great economic benefits for the city. This includes
sometimes astounding personal wealth for themselves, as well as for many of their employees,
those in related industries and others having connections to or dependent on them (McNamara,
2007). The complete domination of Omaha by a private-sector type of community culture and
narrative however, has likewise helped create and extend extreme conditions of poverty and
other social problems for many other of its citizens, particularly those who have no access to the
exclusive social and economic networks that enforce and perpetuate the culture.
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE, MODERNIZATION & IMPROVEMENT
While at times the depiction of Omaha’s community culture based on previous research
may have seemed harsh to some, we can quite truthfully state, that most members of the
disadvantaged, marginalized, excluded, discriminated-against and otherwise alienated groups
with which we have extensive experience, will tell you that the criticism was not nearly strong
enough! Be that as it may, our ultimate intent has not been merely to criticize, but to present
findings and information about the culture and conditions of Omaha, to see if we can discern or
point out facts, patterns, perceptions, clues or new understandings, that might be useful in
bringing needed change, modernization or improvements, for the betterment of all people in
Omaha, or in any other locales where they are needed. The following sub-sections contain what
we believe are the most-important findings gleaned through our efforts, including
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recommendations on how they might best be applied by interested parties, to achieve the
aforementioned goals.
1. Communities, Cultures and Narratives Are Not Static
Despite the fact that Omaha’s community culture has maintained its primary privatesector classification and other characteristics, almost continuously for 160 years since it was
founded, recent research suggests that no communities or their cultures are static or unchanging
(Sinclair, 2002). Anthony Giddens (1984) points out just the opposite in fact, arguing that
communities are continually changing, transitioning and restructuring, even if this process is not
immediately apparent.
These findings should be especially important for community advocates working with or
specializing in dimensions of “social capital,” where human networks, groupings and
collaborations might prove to be fertile ground in which to sew new awareness, ideas and
education, to finally achieve progress in addressing poverty and poor social conditions.
2. The Role of Youth and Generational Change in Social, Political and Economic Progress
McNamara’s (2007) interviews with key informants in Omaha, demonstrate a clear
pattern of concern among various segments of the population, about what the next generation of
leaders will “bring to the table” as the previous generation retires. Some felt that the training of
replacements in the elite, private sector leadership had been well underway for years, to insure a
seamless transition with little change. Others felt quite differently and expressed hope, that the
more-evolved value-systems and extensive knowledge acquired by younger citizens, about the
importance of successfully addressing social problems and massive structural reforms, could be
the keys to “finally tearing down the Berlin Wall” of the imposing resistance to change.
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Our new era of rapidly-evolving capacities for interactions, social organizing and
communication through social media and other forms, should enliven the imaginations of the
designers of and participants in, the next versions of social structures, processes and practices
that are rapidly approaching,
3. A Call for a More “Public Regarding” Community Culture
Dye and Zeigler (1993) are cited by McNamara in his study of Omaha’s community
culture, as calling for the private-sector elite to become more “public regarding.” This notion
may become more acceptable to the elites for a variety of reasons in the near future, perhaps
partially-based on their recent experiences of failure, in attempting to address some of the mostimportant, local, social problems.
On some levels, they must realize that a greater role and financial support, through
higher-taxes or other revenue sources, must be absolutely necessary to effectively address our
growing lists of pressing social and environmental crises in the immediate future. There is likely
also a growing realization among the elites, that that the wildly-growing levels of wealth- and
income-inequality were are seeing in society today, are simply not sustainable and could
jeopardize the entire economic system upon which their lives are based.
4. Strengthening Governmental & Nonprofit Sectors and Increasing Citizen Participation
In public-sector community cultures such as Portland, a stronger, more-effective and
productive government sector exists, which plays key roles in addressing social problems like
poverty, in ways that are not possible for private-sector entities (McNamara, 2007). Local and
state governments are especially well-positioned and have legally-authorized powers in creating
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avenues and venues for meaningful citizen participation in the democratic decision-making
process.
Perhaps most important of all, governments and public administrators could be the key
and legitimate actors, to initiate collaborative cross-sectoral projects. Such collaborations have
proven to be the most-effective organizational structures to address social ills like poverty, in all
arenas of personal, familial and community betterment.
5. Community Culture, Poverty/Social Problems Research and Policy Development
Finally, our greatest hope and highest recommendation is that the findings in this report
(and any subsequent research it may have helped generate) be reviewed, discussed and employed
by wide-ranging and inclusive individuals, groups and institutions in Omaha, Nebraska and
interested communities anywhere, to make needed improvements in cultural performance,
poverty abatement and related-social problem outcomes. As we have noted throughout this
paper, it should be viewed as a starting point for additional investigations and research, better
policy development and more forceful and effective community organization and action.
Progress in these areas will require that those involved in these efforts, transcend and
help transform those aspects of the local community culture and narrative that are actually
creating poverty and other social dysfunctions, or at best, are providing unnecessary resistance to
what clearly and finally, needs to be done to diminish expanding poverty in Omaha and
throughout the U.S.
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